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"In war, in some sense, lies the very genius of law. It is law
creative and active, it is the first principle of law. What is human
warfare but just this, an effort to make the laws of God and nature
takes sides with one party?"
- Henry David Thoreau'

I.

Introduction
Alfred Nobel was a Swedish scientist and inventor with a keen
interest in chemical engineering. He perfected a method to
stabilize the unpredictable liquid explosive, nitroglycerine, and he
developed and patented dynamite, a widely used and
commercially successful explosive that made him wealthy by the
age of forty.2 During the latter part of his life, Nobel worked on
developing weapons-rockets, cannons, and explosives-that he
believed could make war so horrific that it would be unthinkable
to resort to armed conflict.3 Influenced in part by his long
friendship with international peace advocate Austrian Countess
Bertha von Suttner, Nobel developed an interest in efforts to
encourage peace. His last will and testament left the bulk of his
considerable estate to a fund created for the purpose of awarding
prizes to the persons or groups making the most significant
contributions to society -in five categories, including for "the
person who shall have done the most or the best work for
fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of
standing armies, and for the holding and promotion of peace
congresses." This prestigious award is the Nobel Peace Prize.
On October 9, 2009, the Nobel Committee announced that it
had selected United States President Barack Obama as the
recipient of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his "extraordinary
efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation

147 (1881).
See Nils Ringertz, Alfred Nobel: His Life and Work, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
(last
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/biographical/articles/life-work/index.html
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
3 See Sven Tagil, Alfred Nobel's Thoughts about War and Peace,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred nobel/biographical/articles/tagill
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
4 See id; see also Full Text of Alfred Nobel's Will, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred nobel/will/will-full.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
I
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between peoples."'
The Nobel Committee's
official
announcement said:
[Barack] Obama has as President created a new climate in
international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a
central position, with emphasis on the role that the United
Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue
and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even
the most difficult international conflicts.

. .

. Only very rarely

has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's
attention and given its people hope for a better future. His
diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead
the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are
shared by the majority of the world's population.6
President Obama traveled to Oslo, Norway, and on December
10, 2009, he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize. He delivered a
speech at the award ceremony entitled, "A Just and Lasting
Peace." In it, he said:
War, in one form or another, appeared with the first man. At the
dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a
fact, like drought or disease-the manner in which tribes and
then civilizations sought power and settled their differences.
And over time, as codes of law sought to control violence within
groups, so did philosophers and clerics and statesmen seek to
regulate the destructive power of war. The concept of a "just
war" emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when certain
conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in selfdefense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever
possible, civilians are spared from violence ....
Let me make one final point about the use of force. Even as
we make difficult decisions about going to war, we must also
think clearly about how we fight it. The Nobel Committee
recognized this truth in awarding its first prize for peace to
Henry Dunant-the founder of the Red Cross, and a driving

5 Press Release, President Barack Obama, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 (Oct.
9,
2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html
[hereinafter Nobel Press Release]. The award decision generated mixed reactions,
including calls by some for President Obama to decline and state it was not warranted by
his accomplishments after less than nine months in office. See Editorial, A Nobel for
Nothing, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. I1, 2009, at B2.
6 Nobel Press Release, supra note 5.
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force behind the Geneva Conventions.
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic
interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And
even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules,
I believe the United States of America must remain a standard
bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different
from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength.
That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the
prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have
reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the Geneva
Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very
ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor-we honor those
ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is
hard.7
Has the United States lived up to the ideals that President
Obama passionately argued the nation fights to defend? Some
contend that his laudable commitment rests more on rhetoric than
reality, and in the eyes of the world at least its foundations appear
to have eroded in recent years.! Former President and 2002 Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate Jimmy Carter, in an article published in the
New York Times in June 2012, said the United States is
"abandoning its role as the global champion of human rights,"
citing as examples policies that permit targeted assassinations,
indefinite detention without trial at Guantanamo Bay, and
warrantless wiretapping.9 Just two and a half years after President
Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize and delivered his stirring
speech, former President Carter warned:
At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe,
the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic
rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making

7 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the
Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize; see also Nobel Lecture: A Just
and Lasting Peace, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/
laureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
8 See e.g., Jimmy Carter, Op-Ed., A Cruel and Unusual Record, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
25, 2012, at A19 (arguing that the United States has not followed through on the
principles of justice and human rights it swore to defend).
9 See id.
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the world safer, America's violation of international human
rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends.
As concerned citizens, we must persuade Washington to
reverse course and regain moral leadership according to
international human rights norms that we had officially adopted
as our own and cherished throughout the years.' 0
This article examines the development and the objectives of
modem international humanitarian law, particularly the principle
of distinction intended to limit the effects of war on those not
directly involved in the conflict. It looks at actions the United
States took after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that
undermine the foundations upon which international humanitarian
law rests." It also looks at how these actions weaken the legal and
moral authority of the United States and casts doubt upon its claim
to be securely bound to the highest standards of conduct in times

of war.12
War is hell. The law of war tries to make it a little less hellish.'3

II. International Humanitarian Law Before 9/11
A. Law and War: The Effort to Contain the Effects of
Warfare

To some, the notion that the constraints imposed by laws are
expected to apply during the chaos and carnage of war seems
patently irrational. 4 A logical argument can be made that if two
sides have reached a point where they are compelled to take up
arms in an effort to force the other to capitulate, then they should
employ all the means at their disposal in order to prevail.
10 Id.

I See id
12 See id
13 91 CONG. REC. 1830, 1839 (1945) (statement of Mr. Bailey, Sen. From North
Carolina) (quoting General William T. Sherman). After the Civil War, General Sherman
gave a speech to a group of veterans who cheered when he spoke of war. Sherman
responded: "No, my friends; don't look at it that way. War is hell." Id.
14 See generally 91 CONG. REc. 1839-41 (1945) (statements of Mr. Thomas, Sen.
From Utah) (arguing against a lower conscription age in the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940).
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Resorting to total war-the any means necessary approach-in
the pursuit of victory or to exact retribution has been the case at
times. General William Tecumseh Sherman is remembered for his
scorched earth campaign across the American South in the latter
part of the Civil War, which played a role in compelling General
Robert E. Lee and his Confederate Army to surrender." After the
siege and capture of Atlanta in the summer of 1864, Sherman's
forces marched across the Georgia heartland to Savannah before
turning north towards Columbia and into the Carolinas. Along the
way, his troops burned fields, farms, and factories; pillaged food
and anything of value they could find; and took horses, mules and
wagons from the farmers and townspeople they encountered. 6
General Sherman's name still evokes disdain in some of the areas
his troops plundered a century and a half ago.
At the same time Sherman was laying siege to Atlanta in the
summer of 1864, representatives from sixteen nations were
assembled at a diplomatic conference in Geneva, Switzerland,
where they drafted and signed the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field." The conference and the convention that it produced were
in large part due to the efforts of one man: Henry Dunant.
B. Henry Dunant
Henry Dunant was born into a prominent family in Geneva in
1828. He was active in a number of religious and charitable
movements, co-founded the Young Men's Christian Association
(YMCA) of Geneva in 1852, and helped transform the YMCA
into an international organization in 1855." On a business trip to
Italy in 1859, Dunant happened to be nearby when Emperor
Napoleon and King Victor Emanuel II led the 150,000 men of the
15 See
General
William
Tecumseh
Sherman
HISTORYNET.COM,
http://www.historynet.com/general-william-tecumseh-sherman, (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
16 See id.
17 See Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, Geneva, 22 August 1864, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC),
http://www.icrc.org/ihlINTRO/1 20?OpenDocument (last updated May 14, 2012).
18 See YMCA HistoricalFigures: Henry Dunant (1828-1910), WORLD ALLIANCE
(last
OF YMCAs, http://www.ymca.int/who-we-arelhistory/ymca-historical-figures/
visited Jan. 20, 2014).
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Franco-Sardinian Alliance into battle against Austrian Emperor
Franz Josef and his 170,000 troops. The Battle of Solferino took
place on June 24, 1859, and lasted for more than fifteen hours.'
Dunant wrote a vivid description of what transpired on the
battlefield:
Here is a hand-to-hand struggle in all its horror and
frightfulness; Austrians and Allies trampling each other under
foot, killing one another on piles of bleeding corpses, felling
their enemies with their rifle butts, crushing skulls, ripping
bellies open with sabre and bayonet. No quarter is given; it is a
sheer butchery; a struggle between savage beasts, maddened
with blood and fury. Even the wounded fight to the last gasp.
When they have no weapon left, they seize their enemies by the
throat and tear them with their teeth.
A little further on, it is the same picture, only made the more
ghastly by the approach of a squadron of cavalry, which gallops
by, crushing dead and dying beneath its horses' hoofs. One poor
wounded man has his jaw carried away; another his head
shattered; a third, who could have been saved, has his chest
beaten in. Oaths and shrieks of rage, groans of anguish and
despair, mingle with the whinnying of horses.
Here come the artillery, following the cavalry, and going at
full gallop. The guns crash over the dead and wounded, strewn
pell-mell on the ground. Brains spurt under the wheels, limbs
are broken and torn, bodies mutilated past recognition-the soil is
literally puddled with blood, and the plain littered with human
20
remains.
What made the greatest impression on Dunant was not the
ferocity of the battle itself, but the tremendous suffering that
remained after the fighting had ended.
The stillness of the night was broken by groans, by stifled
sighs of anguish and suffering. Heart-rending voices kept
calling for help. Who could ever describe the agonies of that
fearful night!
When the sun came up on the twenty-fifth, it disclosed the
most dreadful sights imaginable. Bodies of men and horses
covered the battlefield; corpses were strewn over roads, ditches,

19

See HENRY DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO

20

Id. at 19-20.

8-9 (1986).
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ravines, thickets and fields; the approaches of Solferino were
literally thick with dead. The fields were devastated, wheat and
corn lying flat on the ground, fences broken, orchards ruined;
here and there were pools of blood. The villages were deserted
and bore the scars left by musket shots, bombs, rockets,
grenades and shells. Walls were broken down and pierced with
gaps where cannonballs had crushed through them. Houses
were riddled with holes, shattered and ruined, and their
inhabitants, who had been in hiding, crouching in cellars without
light or food for nearly twenty hours, were beginning to crawl
out, looking stunned by the terrors they had endured. All around
Solferino, and especially in the village cemetery, the ground was
littered with guns, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, mess tins,
helmets, shakoes, fatigue-caps, belts, equipment of every kind,
remnants of blood-stained clothing and piles of broken weapons.
The poor wounded men that were being picked up all day
long were ghastly pale and exhausted. Some, who had been the
most badly hurt, had a stupefied look as though they could not
grasp what was said to them; they stared at one out of haggard
eyes, but their apparent prostration did not prevent them from
feeling their pain. Others were anxious and excited by nervous
strain and shaken by spasmodic trembling. Some, who had
gaping wounds already beginning to show infection, were
almost crazed with suffering. They begged to be put out of their
misery, and writhed with faces distorted in the grip of the deathstruggle....
Oh, the agony and suffering during those days, the twentyfifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of June! 2 '
Dunant joined members of local communities in an effort to
tend to the wounded and bury the dead.22 His account of the days
that followed record extraordinary acts of compassion and an
abundance of pain and suffering. His observations formed the
basis for his later thoughts on ways to mitigate the effects of
warfare. Dunant wrote:
If there had been enough assistance to collect the wounded in
the plains of Medola and from the bottom of the ravines of San
Martino, on the sharp slopes of Mount Fontana, or on the low
21
22

battle).

Id. at 41, 44, 60.
See generally id. at 122-23 (discussing Dunant's care for the wounded following
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hills above Solferino, how different things would have been!
There would have been none of those long hours of waiting on
June 24, hours of poignant anguish and bitter helplessness,
during which those poor men of the Bersagliere, Uhlans and
Zouaves struggled to rise, despite their fearful pain, and
beckoned vainly for a letter to be brought over to them, and
there would never have been the terrible possibility of what only
too probably happened the next day-living men being buried
among the dead!
If there had been available for the wounded improved means
of transportation better than those now existing, there would
have been no need for the painful amputation that one Light
Infantryman of the Guard had to undergo at Brescia. The need
for that operation arose from deplorable lack of attention when
he was being carried from the regimental flying ambulance to
Castiglione. If this man did not die under the operation, as many
soldiers did, he could thank his own strong and healthy
constitution for it. 23
Dunant proposed the creation of groups of civilian
volunteers-formed in times of peace and recognized as neutrals
by the belligerents when called to action in times of wardedicated to attending to the sick and wounded on the battlefield.
If an international relief society had existed at the time of
Solferino, and if there had been volunteer helpers at Castiglione
on June 24, 25 and 26, or at Brescia at about the same time, as
well as at Mantua or Verona, what endless good they could have
done! ....

Humanity and civilization call imperiously for such an
organization as is here suggested. It seems as if the matter is
one of actual duty, and that in carrying it out the cooperation of
every man of influence, and the good wishes at least of every
decent person can be relied upon with assurance. Is there in the
world a prince or a monarch who would decline to support the
proposed societies, happy to be able to give full assurance to his
soldiers that they will be at once properly cared for if they
should be wounded? Is there any Government that would
hesitate to give its patronage to a group endeavoring in this
manner to preserve the lives of useful citizens, for assuredly the
soldier who receives a bullet in the defense of his country
23

Id
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deserves all that country's solicitude? Is there a single officer, a
single general, considering his troops as "his boys," who would
not be anxious to facilitate the work of volunteer helpers? Is
there a military commissary, or a military doctor, who would not
be grateful for the assistance of a detachment of intelligent
people, wisely and properly commanded and tactful in their
work?2 4
Dunant's account of the Battle of Solferino and its brutal
aftermath, and his suggestions on ways to alleviate suffering
caused by war, led to a conference held in Geneva in 1863 that
gave birth to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and, a year later, the first of what would be several Geneva
Conventions.25 Because of his contributions to achieving the
ideals Alfred Nobel described of peace and a fraternity among
nations, Henry Dunant was the recipient of the first Nobel Peace
Prize awarded in December 1901.26
C. The Heart ofInternationalHumanitarianLaw
International humanitarian law is rooted in the desire to limit
the destructive effects of armed conflict.2 7 One of its most
fundamental principles is the requirement for distinction between
participants in the conflict and those entitled to protection from its
harm.28 For example, the First Geneva Convention which Dunant
helped to enact in 1864 required the armed forces of the
signatories to honor the neutrality of medical personnel, chaplains,
ambulances and hospitals.2 9
There were no comprehensive protections afforded civilians by
treaty or convention prior to World War II since it was "a cardinal
principle of the law of war that military operations must be
confined to the armed forces and that the civilian population must

25

Id. at 120-21, 126-27.
See DUNANT, supra note 19, at 130-31.

26

See Fr6ddric Passy, Henry Dunant-Facts,NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobe

24

lprize.org/nobelprizes/peacellaureates/1901/dunant.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
Dunant spent the latter years of his life destitute and alone in a hospice in Heiden,
Switzerland. He had no funeral and there were no mourners when he died in 1910 at
eighty-two years of age. See id
27 See DUNANT, supra note 19, at 129.
28 See id

29 See id at 130.
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enjoy complete immunity."30 The duty to protect civilians did not
need to be expressly prescribed because it was so universally
understood that the "principle went without saying."3 1 The desire
to create a line separating the participants from the protected was a
heightened concern after World War II; a time when concentration
camps, mass executions, the indiscriminate bombings of cities,
and the destructive power of nuclear weapons were still fresh in
the minds of civilized countries desiring to mitigate suffering and
harm in future armed conflicts.3 2
The principle of distinction is a focal point of each of the four
Conventions of 1949.33 Geneva I, the "Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field," was essentially an updated version of the
Geneva II
First Convention from 1864 on land warfare.34
addressed basically the same rules, although it applied to members
of the armed forces at sea.3 5 Geneva III spelled out the
requirements for the treatment of prisoners of war. 6 Geneva IV,
entitled "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War," was directed specifically at the special
protections to be afforded civilian populations and civilian
property during armed conflicts.37

30 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV: RELATIVE

3 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
Id
32 Press Release, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Honouring Geneva
Conventions, Secretary General Says Debate 'No Longer Between Peace and Justice But
Between
Peace
and
What
Kind
of
Justice,'
SG/SM/12494,
L/T/4417, HR/5002 (Sept. 26, 2009), available at http://unispal.un.orgf/TNISPAL.NSF/
0/857F5A937A9F5F808525763F005C2A9C.
33 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
34 See Geneva 1, supra note 33.
35 See Geneva 11, supra note 33.
36 See Geneva III, supra note 33.
37 See Geneva IV, supra note 33.
TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
31
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The one article that is set out in all four of the conventions is
Common Article 3, which states in pertinent part:
Article 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply,
as a
minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.3 8
Geneva IV is the most comprehensive of the four conventions
(with rules set out in 159 articles and three annexes). 39 The
commentary to Geneva IV provides: "In former times the need to
protect the civilian population in wartime was not felt to the same
degree as since the more recent wars.
Military operations
nowadays-particularly bombing from the air-threaten the whole
population."o

See Geneva I, supra note 33; Geneva II, supra note 33; Geneva III, supra note
33; Geneva IV, supra note 33.
39 See Geneva IV, supra note 33; see generally Geneva I, supra note 33; Geneva
II, supra note 33; Geneva III, supra note 33 (setting out rules in 159 articles and three
annexes).
40 UHLER ET AL., supra note 30, at 118.
38
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History had proven illusory Alfred Nobel's vision of advanced
weaponry so destructive that it would act as a restraint on the will
to resort to war, thereby reducing the damage armed conflicts
caused. 4' Where before the impact of war was generally confined
to the combatants and the field of combat, every advance in
technology-from sword, to bow, to musket, to missile-extended
the reach of war's destructive capabilities and broadened the scope
of those subject to its harmful effects. 42 The Geneva Conventions
of 1949 were intended to ensure that everyone associated with an
armed conflict was covered by some specific status that conveyed
defined rights and responsibilities.4 3
D. The United States: Leading the Development of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw
The United States was actively engaged in the post-World War
11 movement to better define the line separating combatants and
civilians, and to more clearly articulate the rights and protections
to be afforded those not taking part in hostilities. 44 In a letter dated
April 25, 1951, transmitting the Conventions to President Harry S.
Truman for his review and submission to the United States Senate
for advice and consent for ratification, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson recounted:
In the light of experiences of World War II, there was
recognized by all governments the urgent necessity for rather
extensive revisions of the above-mentioned earlier conventions
[the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and the Hague Convention of
1907] for the purpose of bringing them up to date, making them
easier to apply uniformly and less susceptible to different
interpretations, and providing more effective protection of the
categories of persons covered. It was considered equally
important to secure by treaty international legal protection for
41 See Tlgil, supra note 3.
42 See generally Martin van Creveld, War and Technology, FOOTNOTES (Foreign
Policy Research Inst.'s Wachman Ctr. for Civic and Int'l Literacy, Phila., Pa.), Oct.
2007, available at http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1225.200710.vancreveld.wartech
nology.html (discussing the impact of technology on warfare).
43 See Geneva IV, supra note 33, art. 3.
44 See Christina D. Elmore, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing
Combatantsfrom Civilians in the War Against Terrorism, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 213, 21920 (2008); see also Susan Tiefenbrun, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 91, 111 (2005).
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civilians in belligerent and occupied territories. The generally
unsatisfactory stopgap measure of attempting to apply the
prisoners-of-war convention to certain categories of civilians
during World War II had pointed up the need for a separate
treaty establishing humane standards of treatment for civilians in
time of war.
The United States had from the beginning actively supported
the initiative taken in the fall of 1945 by the International
Committee of the Red Cross to revise the existing conventions
and to formulate a new civilian convention before the
experiences of World War II had been forgotten. 45
The Senate authorized ratification on July 6, 1955, with all the
members present for the roll call vote casting their votes for
approval. President Dwight D. Eisenhower-the former General
of the Army who served as the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe in World War II-ratified the conventions on July 14,
1955.46

After World War II, the frequency of international armed
conflicts declined from an average of more than six per year to
less than one, and the number of battlefield deaths declined from
20,000 per year to less than 6,000.47 While those numbers suggest
a positive downward trend, not all of the numbers are as
encouraging. In World War I, for example, fourteen percent of all

45 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Copies of the
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims to U.S. Senate, 82d Cong. (April
26, 1951), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/GCmessage195 1.pdf.
46 See 101 CONG. REC. D474 (daily ed. July 6, 1955); see also Letter from Dwight
D. Eisenhower to E. Roland Harriman (Aug. 1, 1955) (doc. 1536), in THE PAPERS OF
DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER, at 1802-D3 (L. Galambos & D. van Ee eds., at 1996). The
United States ratified Geneva IV with one reservation: "The United States reserves the
right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68,
paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offences referred to therein are punishable by
death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins." I FED.
POLITICAL. DEP'T OF SwITz., FINAL REC. OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONF. OF GENEVA OF 1949,
346 (1949), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Dipl-Conf-1949FinalVol-1.pdf.
47 See THE HUMAN SEC. REP. PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REP. 2009/2010: THE
CAUSES OF PEACE AND THE SHRINKING COSTS OF WAR 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter CAUSES OF
PEACE], available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR20092010/2009
201 OHumanSecurityReport-CoverPage.pdf
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deaths were civilian.4 8 Now, almost a century later, armed
conflicts produce about ten civilian deaths for every one
combatant that is killed. 49 The data suggest that the effort to limit
the effects of armed conflict to the combatants on the battlefield
and to protect civilian populations has not been successful.
Nonetheless, the belief in the underlying civilian protection
principle has not dissipated."o Researchers from the International
Committee of the Red Cross in 1999-2000 concluded:
Yet the more these conflicts have degenerated into wars on
civilians, the more people have reacted by reaffirming the
norms, traditions, conventions and rules that seek to create a
barrier between those who carry arms into battle and the civilian
population. In the face of unending violence, these populations
have not abandoned their principles nor forsaken their traditions.
Large majorities in every war-tom country reject attacks on
civilians in general and a wide range of actions that by design or
default could harm the innocent. The experience has heightened
consciousness of what is right and wrong in war. People in
battle zones across the globe are looking to forces in civil
society, their own state institutions, and international
organizations to assert themselves and impose limits that will
protect civilians. 5 1
The United States has been engaged militarily almost
continuously since the end of World War II: in Korea, Vietnam,
Iraq, Panama, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia,
among other places.52 While members of the U.S. armed forces
failed on occasion to adhere to the standards established by the

48

See BARRY S. LEVY & VICTOR W. SIDEL, WAR AND PUBLICHEALTH 33 (1997).

49 See Stanley B. Greenberg & Robert 0. Boorstin, People on War: Civilians in
the Line of Fire, THE ROPER CENTER PUB. PERSP. MAG., Nov./Dec. 2001, reprinted at
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/article-public-perspective-2001.pdf.
50 See PAUL

D.

WILLIAMS,

ENHANCING

CIVILIAN

PROTECTION

IN

PEACE

(Afr. Cent. for Strategic Studies, Sept. 2010); see
also Annette Becker, The Dilemmas of ProtectingCivilians in Occupied Territory: The
PrecursoryExample of World War 1, 94 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 117 (2012).
51 Greenberg & Boorstin, supra note 49, at 19.
OPERATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM AFRICA I

52 See CAUSES OF PEACE, supra note 47, at Table 10.1. Anti-colonialism following

World War II was a factor in many armed conflicts. The two colonial powers, France
and the United Kingdom, have engaged in more state-based armed conflicts than any
other countries from 1946-2008, followed by the two Cold War super-powers, Russia
and the United States. See id.

998

N.C. J.INT'L L. &COM. REG.

Vol. XXX

Geneva Conventions and the spirit of international humanitarian
law-the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War is an
infamous example-entering the twenty-first century, the United
States was generally recognized as adhering to high standards on
the battlefield.53 Earning and maintaining that reputation paid
dividends. In the Gulf War in 1991, for example, the United
States dropped leaflets encouraging Iraqi soldiers to surrender and
providing instructions on how to do so safely.5 4 Consequently,
more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers deserted or surrendered, enabling
the ground war to come to a quick end with minimal casualties for
the United States and its coalition partners. About ninety-eight
percent of Iraqi soldiers said they saw the leaflets, eighty-eight
percent believed the message, and seventy percent cited it as a
reason for deciding to put down their weapons and surrender."
From a military perspective, having enemy troops lay down their
weapons and raise their hands in surrender is far preferable to the
From a national interest
soldiers digging in and fighting.
perspective, ending an armed conflict quickly reduces costs and
facilitates the return to peace. 6
Despite the important leadership role the United States played
in the development of international humanitarian law after World
War II, it has at times opted not to approve agreements most other
countries supported, including many adopted by traditional U.S.
allies. The United States, for example, is not among the 172 state
53 See generally United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973) (detailing the My
Lai massacre during the Vietnam War). Lieutenant Calley was convicted of twenty-two
counts of premeditated murder for ordering his troops to kill civilian men, women and
children in the village of My Lai. See id. at 22. He was sentenced to confinement for
life, but President Richard Nixon reduced his sentence, and Calley served three years on
house arrest. See Calley Expresses Remorse for Role in My Lai Massacre in Vietnam,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/22/nation/na-my-lai22.
54 See Andrew M. Clark & Thomas B. Christie, Ready... Ready... Drop!: A
Content Analysis of CoalitionLeaflets Used in the Iraq War, 67 GAZETTE 141 (2005).
55 See Peter J. Smyczek, Regulating the Battlefield of the Future: The Legal
Limitations of the Conduct of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Under Public
InternationalLaw, 57 A.F. L. REV. 209, 211 (2005); see also, Douglas Waller, Opening
Up the Psyops War, TIME, Oct. 16, 2001, http://content.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,179827,00.html.
56 See, e.g., Robert Naiman, Ending Wars on Time Would Save $200 Billion, 1/6 of
Debt
Reduction
Goal,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Aug.
23,
2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/ending-wars-on-time-would-b-93
4372.html (showing how ending a conflict can save money).
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parties to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts that went into effect in 1978.57 President Reagan sent
Additional Protocol II to the Senate for advice and consent, but in
the same message he noted his objections to the requirements of
Additional Protocol I:
Protocol I is fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed. It
contains provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and
endanger civilians in war. One of its provisions, for example,
would automatically treat as an international conflict any socalled "war of national liberation." Whether such wars are
international or non-international should turn exclusively on
objective reality, not on one's view of the moral qualities of
each conflict. To rest on such subjective distinctions based on a
war's alleged purposes would politicize humanitarian law and
eliminate the distinction between international and noninternational conflicts. It would give special status to "wars of
national liberation," an ill-defined concept expressed in vague,
subjective, politicized terminology. Another provision would
grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not
satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws
of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists
and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves. These
problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be
remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not
to submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would
invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this
view. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded that
a number of the provisions of the Protocol are militarily
unacceptable.
It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would
have preferred to ratify such a convention, which as I said
contains certain sound elements. But we cannot allow other
nations of the world, however numerous, to impose upon us and
57 See Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties: Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
InternationalArmed Conflicts (ProtocolI), 8 June 1977, ICRC, May 14, 2012, available
at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates=XpagesNORM
StatesParties&xp treatySelected-470 (listing the states that are parties to the
Convention).
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our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful
price for joining a convention drawn to advance the laws of war.
In fact, we must not, and need not, give recognition and
protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in
humanitarian law.58
The United States joined with countries whom many consider
to be among the international humanitarian law rouges' galleryChina, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, and Yemen-in voting against
the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court.59
The United States and Somalia are the only two countries that
have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.6 0 The
United States-along with China, Pakistan and Russia-has not
signed the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.6 1
Advocating for the necessity of respect for human rights and the
principles of international humanitarian law, while opting to avoid
the limitations of major international humanitarian initiatives,
creates an appearance that the United States is better at preaching
than it is at practicing. Expressions of ideals that do not match
corresponding actions create an impression that there are two
standards at play: one that applies to what the United States
expects of others and one that the United States applies only to
58 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Protocol II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Noninternational Armed Conflict, Jan. 29, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/protocol-II- I00-2.pdf.
59 Michael Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an InternationalCriminal
Court, THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW INSIGHTS, (Aug. 1998), available at
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspuilbitstream/1 23456789/8465/1 /Results%20of/o2Othe%2
ORome%20Conference%20for/o20an%20International%20Criminal%20Court.pdf
1.
President Clinton signed the treaty shortly before leaving office, but it was never
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. See The Reckoning: The Battlefor the
International Criminal Court, Background, PUBIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (PBS),
http://www.pbs.org/pov/reckoningbackground.php. On May 6, 2002, the Bush
administration notified the United Nations Secretary General that the United States was
not going to become a party to the treaty. See Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Under
Sec'y of State for Arms Control and Int'l Sec. to Kofi Annan, UN Sec'y Gen. (May 6,
2002), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/02/26/Abagnin
inbolton.pdf.
60 See Convention on the Rights of the Child: FrequentlyAsked Questions, UNITED

NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND (UNICEF) (Nov. 30, 2005),

http://www.unicef.org/crc/index 30229.html.
61 See Daryll Kimball, The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and State-Parties,
ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (Mar. 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawasigs.
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itself.
E. Losing Momentum and Focus

The United States ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1955.62
Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
support of ratification, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Robert Murphy said:
The Geneva Conventions are another long step forward
toward mitigating the severities of war on its helpless victims.
They reflect enlightened practices as carried out by the United
States and other civilized countries and they represent largely
what the United States would do whether or not a party to the
Conventions. Our own conduct has served to establish higher
standards and we can only benefit by having them incorporated
in a stronger body of conventional wartime law.. .. We feel that
ratification of the Conventions now before you would be fully in
the interest of the United States.6 3
Deputy Secretary Murphy's statement reflects the still popular
notion that the United States is a shining light for other countries
to follow. It conveys a sense that while the conventions were
necessary to lift others up to the American standard, the conduct of
the United States already lived up to the "enlightened practices"
that were reduced to writing in Geneva.6 4
Congress did nothing for forty years to enact a domestic means
of enforcement for the Geneva Conventions' prohibitions. North
Carolina Congressman Walter Jones introduced the War Crimes
Act in 1995 to fill the void that followed the ratification of the
conventions. 5 He wanted to ensure that Americans who were
victims of war crimes had the opportunity to pursue justice. At a
hearing in June 1996 before a subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, Congressman Jones said:
The bill is simple and straightforward. Presently, in the
absence of an international criminal tribunal or a military
62 See R.R. Baxter, The Geneva Convention of 1949 Before the United States
Senate, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 550, 551 (1955).
63 H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 2 (1996).
64 See id.
65 See 142 CONG. REC. H8620 (daily ed. July 29, 1996) (statement of Rep. Walter

Jones), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1996-07-29/pdf/CREC-1996-0729.pdf.
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commission, we have no means by which we can try and
prosecute individuals who have committed a war crime against
an American citizen.
This legislation before you today will give the United States
the legal authority to prosecute individuals who have committed
a war crimes act against an American citizen. The bill restores
justice by filling the gaps in federal criminal law relating to the
prosecution of individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention. When passed, the United States will no longer be a
safe haven for anyone having committed such crimes.
The bill before the subcommittee is particularly important to the
men and women in the armed services. As a member of the
House National Security Committee, I was astonished to learn
that currently there is no law that provides the means for
prosecuting unspeakable crimes committed by foreign nationals
against our U.S. service personnel.
While the Geneva Convention of 1949 provides the United
States with the authority, we have not yet passed legislation to
provide the courts with the enforcement mechanism. This gap
in the federal law is unacceptable. 6 6
Representative Jones was motivated to propose legislation in
large part by the story of Michael Cronin who spent six years in
the "Hanoi Hilton" as a prisoner of war after being shot down
during the Vietnam War.67 Mr. Cronin returned home to the
United States, earned a law degree, and worked to get legislation
passed to create an enforcement mechanism for the Geneva
Conventions. Testifying alongside Representative Jones at the
subcommittee hearing, Mr. Cronin said:
I believe this is important legislation and I have personal
experience to bear this out. Our opponents in the field have
consistently denied Americans the benefits of the Geneva
66

War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the House Subcomm. on

Immigr. and Claims, 104th Cong. 5 (1996) (statement of Rep. Walter Jones), available at

http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative histories/pI104-192/hear-81-1996.pdf. House
Bill 2587 was the predecessor to House Bill 3680, which was enacted into law on August
21, 1996, as the War Crimes Act of 1996. See H.R. REP. No. 104-698, supra note 63, at 9
(1996); see also War Crimes Act of 1996, THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/is/legislativehistories/pIl04-192/pll04-192.html (providing
all legislative materials relevant to the War Crimes Act).
67 See STUART I. ROCHESTER, THE BATTLE BEHIND BARS: NAVY AND MARINE

POWs INTHE VIETNAM WAR 15 (Edward J. Marolda & Sandra J. Doyle eds., 2010).
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Conventions, and since World War II they have done so with
impunity. This legislation can change that....
War is an extraordinary event. It defies rationality and
ordinary laws. The worst effects of war can be ameliorated only
by the laws of war, which are themselves extraordinary and can
be enforced only by extraordinary means such as this bill. 68
The original proponents of the War Crimes Act, which passed
with overwhelming bi-partisan support, envisioned Americans as
the potential victims of the "unspeakable crimes" committed by
others in the course of armed conflicts. 69
The thought of
Americans as potential perpetrators of war crimes was simply
beyond the pale.7 0
III. The United States and International Humanitarian Law
After 9/11
A. 9/11: The Home of the Brave In the Face ofFear
In January 1981, Tom Ahem was about to regain his freedom
and end his 444-day ordeal as a hostage in the U.S. Embassy
during the Iranian Revolution." The former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Tehran station chief was taken before Hossein
Sheikh-ol-eslam, the man who had been his primary interrogator
and abuser during his period of captivity.72 Sheikh-ol-eslam said
that the beatings Ahern suffered were inconsistent with Islam and
with Sheikh-ol-eslam's personal values, and he offered Ahem the
opportunity to beat him with the same rope he had used on Ahern.
Tom Ahern declined the offer, protesting that, "we don't do stuff
like that."7 3
68 War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearingon H.R. 2587 Before the House Subcomm. on
Immigr. and Claims, 104th Cong. 5 (1996) (statement of Capt. Michael P. Cronin),
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/1s/legislativehistories/pl 104-192/hear-8 11996.pdf.
69 See generally Michael John Garcia, Cong. Res. Serv., RL 33662, The War
Crimes Act: Current Issues (2009) (detailing the crimes covered by the War Crimes Act
and how it has changed over time); H.R. REP. No. 104-698, supra note 63.
70 See H.R. REP. No. 104-698, supra note 63, at 2-3.
71 See The Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran, April 24-25, 1980: Hostages Recount
Their Captivity, RESCUEATTEMPT.COM, http://www.rescueattempt.com/idI6.html.
72 See generally MARK BOWDEN, GUESTS OF THE AYATOLLAH (2006) (detailing the

Iranian Hostage Crisis and the role played by Hossein Sheikh-ol-eslam).
73 Id. at 579. Hossein Sheikh-ol-eslam now serves as the senior international
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That was 1981. Things changed after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. Some members of President George W.
Bush's administration saw an opening created by the fear that
followed the 9/11 attacks and seized upon it to radically expand
executive branch power-particularly the power of the President
himself-and in many respects undermined the basis for
international humanitarian law championed by the United States
after World War I.74 Columnist Andrew Sullivan described the
transformation of America after 9/11 in a Newsweek article
published in September 2011:
As mysterious envelopes containing anthrax began to appear
in mailboxes, as our airports shut down and reopened as police
states, as terror-advisory color codes were produced, as the vast
new bureaucratic behemoth of the Department of Homeland
Security was set up, as a system of torture prisons (beginning
with Guantinamo Bay) was constructed ... many concluded the
threat must be grave enough to justify shredding some of the
Constitution's noblest principles and precedents. This handful
of [Islamic] fanatics was supposedly a greater threat than the
Nazis and the Soviets. And so much of our inherited moral
wisdom-such as the absolute stricture against torture and the
ideal of habeas corpus-were tossed aside. Dick Cheney, the
man elected vice president as a calming father figure, became
the most terrified of them all. And so we joined him in fearing
that Al Qaeda was on the cusp of arming itself with WMDs that
could be used to end our civilization.
In 2008, Barack Obama presented himself as a stark contrast to
George W. Bush and the policies of his administration that had the

affairs advisor to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. See Top Advisor: US.
Congressmen's Sanctions Bill Against Iran Presented Under Zionists' Pressure, FARS
http://english.farsnews.com/new
AGENCY
(Dec.
24,
2013),
NEWS
stext.aspx?nn=13921003001263.
74 See generally, CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007) (describing the role
of Dick Cheney in the Bush presidency and the expansion of executive power during the
administration).
75 Andrew Sullivan, Andrew Sullivan Asks: Did Osama Win on 9/11?, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/andrew-sullivan-asks-did-osama-win-91167355. For more in-depth analysis of the dramatic expansion of executive authority post9/11; see SAVAGE, supra note 74; see also FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARTZ, JR. & AzIZ Z.
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2008).
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United States fighting two wars and engaged in practices at home
and abroad that eroded liberties and America's moral standing. In
a memorable speech before a huge crowd in Denver, Colorado, in
August 2008, Obama accepted the Democratic Party's presidential
nomination, declaring:
If John McCain wants to follow George Bush with more tough
talk and bad strategy, that is his choice-but that is not the
change we need.
We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy.
So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country.
Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe. The BushMcCain foreign policy has squandered the legacy that
generations of Americans-Democrats and Republicans-have
built, and we are here to restore that legacy.
As Commander-in-Chief, I will never hesitate to defend this
nation, but I will only send our troops into harm's way with a
clear mission and a sacred commitment to give them the
equipment they need in battle and the care and benefits they
deserve when they come home.
I will end this war in Iraq responsibly and finish the fight
against Al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. I will rebuild
our military to meet future conflicts. But I will also renew the
tough, direct diplomacy that can prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons and curb Russian aggression. I will build new
partnerships to defeat the threats of the twenty-first century:
terrorism and nuclear proliferation; poverty and genocide;
climate change and disease. And I will restore our moral
standing so that America is once again that last, best hope for all
who are called to the cause of freedom, who long for lives of
76
peace, and who yearn for a better future.
It appeared Obama intended to make good on his lofty
campaign rhetoric and begin restoring America's moral standing
once he was sworn in as president. On his second day in office, he
signed an executive order directing a review of each detainee held
at Guantanamo Bay, suspending military commissions, and
mandating the closure of the detention facility not later than
January 22, 2010.77 In May 2009, President Obama gave a major
76 Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the Democratic National Convention: The
American Promise (Aug. 28, 2008).
77 Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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speech at the National Archives-the home, as Obama noted, of
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of
Rights-on changing course on national security and returning to
American values:
I've studied the Constitution as a student, I've taught it as a
teacher, I've been bound by it as a lawyer and a legislator. I
took an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen, I know that we must
never, ever, turn our back on its enduring principles for
expedience sake.
I make this claim not simply as a matter of idealism. We
uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is
right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe.
Time and again, our values have been our best national security
asset-in war and peace; in times of ease and in eras of
upheaval....
Unfortunately, faced with an uncertain threat, our
government made a series of hasty decisions. I believe that
many of these decisions were motivated by a sincere desire to
protect the American people. But I also believe that all too often
our government made decisions based on fear rather than
foresight; that all too often our Government trimmed facts and
Instead of
evidence to fit ideological predispositions.
strategically applying our power and our principles, too often we
set those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer
afford. And during this season of fear, too many of usDemocrats and Republicans, politicians, journalists, and
citizens-fell silent.
In other words, we went off course.78
Now well into President Obama's second term, it is clear that
America has not made significant progress towards regaining its
moral authority at home or abroad. Despite the pledges President
Obama made in 2008 and 2009 to change course and recommit to
America's enduring principles, the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay remains open, indefinite detention without trial
continues, and he has embraced and expanded most of the hawkish
practices he inherited from President Bush.7 9 Mitt Romney, 2012
78 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May
21, 2009) [hereinafter National Security Remarks].
79 See Charlie Savage, Election Will Decide Future of Interrogation Methods for
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Republican presidential candidate, pledged that if he was elected,
he would take an even more radical national security approach
than President Obama and restore some of the most extreme Bushera practices that Obama banned."
While the future course of America's national security policy
is unclear, one thing that is certain is that many of its post-9/1 1
practices have eroded the most fundamental objective of
international humanitarian law: distinguishing civilians from
combatants in order to mitigate the effects of armed conflicts on
civilians."' There are numerous examples that illustrate the point.
1. Labeling the Geneva Conventions "Quaint" and
"Obsolete"
Then-acting White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, who
would later serve as the Attorney General of the United States,
sent President Bush a memorandum on January 25, 2002, entitled
"Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners
of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban."82 In it,
Gonzales wrote:
As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war.
It is not the traditional clash between nations adhering to the
laws of war that formed the backdrop for GPW [Geneva
Covention IV]. The nature of the new war places a high
premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain
information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order
to avoid further atrocities or war crimes, such as wantonly
killing civilians. In my judgment, this new paradigm renders
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring
that captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary

Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at Al [hereinafter Election]. President
Obama signed an executive order on Jan. 22, 2009, banning the enhanced interrogation
techniques used during the Bush administration that many called torture. See Exec. Order
No. 13491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
80 See Election, supra note 79.
81 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, on Decision
Regarding Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), availableat
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf.
82 Id.
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privileges, scrip (i.e., advances of monthly pay), athletic
uniforms and scientific instruments.83
The Geneva Conventions were supposed to create a binding
set of legal obligations regulating the conduct of their signatories
during armed conflicts. They were supposed to prescribe the
status of every person in and around an armed conflict and carry
specific rights and responsibilities for each status. Treating the
conventions as historical relics that the leader of a nation can
dismiss at his or her leisure dilutes any authority they may have to
compel military powers to operate within their bounds.
2. Creatinga New Status to Which No Laws Apply

Not only did the Bush Administration decide that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, it also
decided that members of those forces and their supporters had no
legal rights if captured, except for whatever rights the President
alone afforded them as a matter of grace.84 Deputy Attorney
General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert Delahunty prepared
a memorandum for Department of Defense General Counsel Jim
Haynes on January 2, 2002, expressing their legal opinion that the
only rights that applied were those the President extended at his
discretion. For example, they wrote:
To say that the specific provisions of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions do not apply in the current conflict with the Taliban
militia as a legal requirement is by no means to say that the
principles of the laws of armed conflict cannot be applied as a
matter of U.S.

Government policy.

The President as

Commander-in-Chief can determine as a matter of his judgment
for the efficient prosecution of the military campaign that the
policy of the United States will be to enforce customary
standards of the law of war against the Taliban and to punish
any transgression against those standards.

. .

. A decision to

apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions or of other laws
of war as a matter of policy, not law, would be fully consistent
with the past practice of the United States.85
83
84

Id.

See id.
85 Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Defense (Jan. 9, 2002),
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Consistent with this legal guidance, President Bush signed a
memorandum on February 7, 2002, saying the United States
would abide by the Geneva Conventions with respect to the
conflict in Afghanistan, but that the Conventions did not apply to
captured Al Qaeda and Taliban forces.86 As he explained, "Our
Nation recognizes that this new paradigm-ushered in not by us,
but by terrorists-requires new thinking in the law of war, but
thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles

of Geneva."8 7
The Supreme Court later invalidated the flawed legal analysis
that allowed individuals to be held indefinitely outside the reach of
any law. In 2004, the Court held that detainees at Guantanamo
Bay had the right under the federal habeas statute to challenge in
federal court the government's basis for holding them in
detention." In 2006, the Court held that President Bush did not
have the unilateral authority to create a military commission
system to try alleged unlawful enemy combatants and that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to

available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf. Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee signed the final version on Jan. 22, 2002. See
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes
II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020122.pdf. Bybee is now a judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Biographical Directory of Federal
Judges: Bybee, Jay S., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last

visited Jan. 19, 2014). Yoo is a professor of law at the University of California at
Berkeley.

Berkeley Law Faculty Profiles: John

Choon

Yoo,

BERKELEY LAW,

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?faclD=235
(last
visited Jan. 19, 2014). A Department of Justice investigation found that Bybee and Yoo
should not face criminal charges over their legal opinions, but that they committed
professional misconduct and should be reported to their state bars for disciplinary
actions. In February 2010, Associate Attorney General David Margolis overruled the
findings and recommendations. Jess Bravin, Lawyers Cleared Over 9/11 Memos, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2010, at A5.
86 Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central
Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002), available at dspace.wrlc.org/doc/
bitstream/2041/63446/00207display.pdf.
87 Id.

88 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 480-82 (2004).
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detainees.89 In 2008, the Court held that even though Congress
expressly revoked federal court jurisdiction to hear detainee cases
brought under the habeas statute in response to the Court's 2004
decision, detainees nonetheless had a constitutional right of habeas
corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.90 Despite the
claims that a President has virtually limitless and unchecked
authority to act in matters involving national security, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that all three branches of government have
a role to play and that "a state of war is not a blank check for the
President."91
3. Rebranding Torture
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits
torture; 92 as do the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, the War Crimes Act, and the U.S.
Criminal Code.93 The United States was a leading proponent of
such measures aimed at banning torture.9 4 When President Ronald
Reagan sent the Convention Against Torture to the Senate for
advice and consent for ratification in 1988, he wrote:
The United States participated actively and effectively in the
negotiation of the Convention. It marks a significant step in the
development during this century of international measures
against torture and other inhuman treatment or punishment.
Ratification of the Convention by the United States will clearly
express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice

89

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 626-28 (2006).

90 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771-72 (2008).
91 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). The "blank check" quote in
Justice O'Connor's opinion is from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587 (1952) and refers specifically to the rights of U.S. citizens. The Court's
subsequent decisions in detainee cases, however, show that periods of armed conflict do
not give presidents a blank check over non-citizens either. See, e.g., Boumediene at 771
(holding that aliens detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to
the privilege of habeas corpus).
92 Geneva III, supra note 33.
93 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; War
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012); Alicia Dawn Koehl Respect for National
Cemeteries Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
94 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2441, 2340A.
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unfortunately still prevalent in the world today.
The core provisions of the Convention establish a regime for
international cooperation in the criminal prosecution of torturers
relying on so-called "universal jurisdiction." Each State Party is
required either to prosecute torturers who are found in its
territory or to extradite them to other countries for prosecution.95
The United States has taken severe action against those who
commit torture when America's vital national interests are not
involved. In January 2009, a federal court in Miami, Florida,
sentenced Charles McArthur Emmanuel to ninety-seven years in
prison for, among other things, torture conducted in Liberia.96 It
was the first conviction and sentence ever under the federal torture
statute since its enactment in 1994. Mr. Emmanuel, also known as
Chuckie Taylor, is the son of former Liberian President Charles
Taylor. From 1997 to 2003, he helped his father maintain power
by torturing and murdering his critics. 9 7 In May 2012, the
International Criminal Court at The Hague sentenced Charles
Taylor to fifty years in prison for aiding and abetting war crimes
committed in Sierra Leone. 98 Charles Taylor supplied weapons to
the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in
exchange for blood diamonds. The RUF abducted children and
turned them into child soldiers, forced women into sexual slavery,
and mutilated or murdered many others during more than a decade
of civil war. 99 Taylor's case marked the first war crimes
conviction and sentence of a former head of state by an
international war crimes tribunal.100
The United States does not have an enviable record when it
comes to torture committed on its behalf. In the wake of the
95 President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention
Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment (May 20, 1998), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/052088f.htm. The Senate gave
consent on October 27, 1990. See 136 CONG. REC. S17, 486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Terry Sanford), 1990 WL 168442 (Oct. 27, 1990).
96 Carmen Gentile, Son ofEx-President ofLiberia Gets 97 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2009, at Al4.
97 Drew Hinshaw, Court Sentences Liberian Dictator,WALL ST. J., May 31, 2012,
at A13.
98 Id.
99 See id.
100 See id.

1012

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Vol. XXXIX

terrorist attacks in September 2001, some within the Bush
administration wanted to use more aggressive interrogation
techniques to extract information from suspected terrorists and
terrorism supporters, but worried that they may cross the line and
commit torture.10 1 The Department of Justice stepped in and
provided legal cover for more harsh interrogation tactics. In a
forty-six page memorandum prepared for White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales in August 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay
Bybee wrote:
We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in
§2340 [the torture provision of the U.S. Criminal Code], it must
inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting
to torture must be equivalent to intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental
pain or suffering to amount to torture under §2340, it must result
in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g.,
lasting for months or even years. We conclude that the mental
harm also must result from one of the predicate acts listed in the
statute, namely: threats of imminent death; threats of infliction
of the kind of pain that would amount to physical torture;
infliction of such physical pain as a means of psychological
torture; use of drugs or other procedures designed to deeply
disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual's
personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third
party. The legislative history simply reveals that Congress
intended for the statute's definition to track the Convention's
definition of torture and the reservations, understandings, and
declarations that the United States submitted with its ratification.
We conclude that the statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that
it prohibits only extreme acts.102
In addition to sanctioning extreme standards for permissible
interrogation methods-anything short of the pain caused by death
or organ failure-Bybee also provided legal cover in the event the
101 See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 - 2340A (Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memogonzales-aug2002.pdf.
102 Id. Bybee was appointed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2008.
See The Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view-seniority_1ist.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
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torture line was crossed.'o He concluded that any prohibition or
criminal penalty for torture would be an unconstitutional intrusion
on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief in a time of
war. He said:
Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate
§2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it
impermissibly encroached on the President's constitutional
power to conduct a military campaign. As Commander-inChief, the President has the constitutional authority to order
interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence
information concerning the military plans of the enemy. The
demands of the Commander-in-Chief power are especially
pronounced in the middle of a war in which the nation has
already suffered a direct attack. In such a case, the information
gained from interrogations may prevent future attacks by foreign
enemies. Any effort to apply §2340A in a manner that interferes
with the President's direction of such core war matters as the
detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would be
unconstitutional.... [T]he President enjoys complete discretion
in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in
conducting operations against hostile forces.1 04
Given the extreme threshold the Bybee memorandum set for
acts constituting torture and the legal shield it provided for
violations,' the Department of Defense and the CIA implemented
a series of enhanced interrogation techniques. 06 1In some instances
See Memorandum, supra note 101.
104 Id. at 31, 33.
105 Editorial, No Penaltyfor Torture,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, at A26 [hereinafter
No Penalty for Torture]. The memoranda drafted by Department of Justice lawyers
sanctioning extreme interrogation techniques are commonly known as the "torture
memos." Id.
106 Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep't of
Defense, to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, Counter-Resistance Techniques (Nov.
27, 2002), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20021127-1.pdf.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, based on the legal advice of his general counsel,
William J. Haynes, III, signed a memorandum authorizing harsh interrogation techniques
that included: stress positions, forced standing for up to four hours, depravation of light
and sound, hooding, removing all of the detainee's clothing, shaving the detainee's facial
hair, playing on phobias such as a fear of dogs, threats of harm to the detainee or his
family, temperature extremes, dietary manipulation, slapping and poking, and
waterboarding. Rumsfeld wrote on the memorandum, "I stand for 8-10 hours a day.
Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" Id.
103
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the enhanced techniques crossed the line into torture.107
Susan Crawford served as General Counsel of the Army
during the Reagan administration and served as the Department of
Defense Inspector General under former Vice President Dick
Cheney when he was the Secretary of Defense.'"o
She was
appointed to be the senior official responsible for overseeing the
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, a role entitled
"Convening Authority," by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in
February 2007 shortly after she retired as an appellate court
judge.10 9 In an interview with Rob Woodrow of the Washington
Post published in January 2009, in the final days of the Bush
administration, Crawford explained why she dismissed military
commission charges against Guantanamo detainee Mohammed alQahtani: "We tortured Qahtani. His treatment met the legal
definition of torture. And that's why I did not refer the case for
prosecution."''
The treatment Mohammed al-Qahtani experienced was not
unique. The CIA acknowledged waterboarding three high-value
detainees held in secret sites outside the United States."' Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11
attacks, was waterboarded a reported 183 times." 2
Other
investigations have found many more examples of conduct by
members of the U.S. armed forces or intelligence agencies that
would in the minds of most people constitute torture.' 13
See No Penaltyfor Torture, supra note 105.
108 Andy Worthington, Bush Era Ends With Guantanamo Trial Chief's Torture
Confession, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2009), http://fff.org/explorefreedom/article/bush-era-ends-guantnamo-trial-chiefs-torture-confession/.
109 Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says US. Official; Trial Overseer Cites
'Abusive' Methods Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al.
107

110 Id.

Ill Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. 'Cannot' Probe Waterboarding, Mukasey Says,
Feb. 8, 2008, at A4.
112 Peter Finn & Julie Tate, U.S. Looking into 2 DetaineeDeaths, WASH. POST, July
1, 2011, at Al.
13 See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN LIVES: MEDICAL
EVIDENCE OF TORTURE BY US PERSONNEL AND ITS IMPACT (2008), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHRReports/BrokenLaws_14.pdf, see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WASH. POST,

WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS: US-LED ABUSE AND RENDITION OF OPPONENTS

To

GADDAFI'S

LIBYA

(2012),

09/06/delivered-enemy-hands-0.

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/
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President Obama ordered an end to enhanced interrogation
techniques and compliance with the Army Field Manual's
limitations on interrogation methods in January 2009.114 He has,
however, taken a "look forward, not back" approach to the abuses
committed during the Bush administration.' 15 In his speech on
national security in May 2009, he said:
[W]e need to focus on the future. I recognize that many still
have a strong desire to focus on the past. When it comes to
actions of the last eight years, passions are high. Some
Americans are angry; others want to re-fight debates that have
been settled, in some cases debates that they have lost. I know
that these debates lead directly, in some cases, to a call for a
fuller accounting, perhaps through an independent commission.
I've opposed the creation of such a commission because I
believe that our existing democratic institutions are strong
enough to deliver accountability. The Congress can review
abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the
Congress into matters like enhanced interrogation techniques.
The Department of Justice and our courts can work through and
punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice."'
Attorney General Eric Holder announced in June 2011 that an
investigation into about 100 cases of potential abuse of detainees
while in CIA custody was closed and that only two cases where
detainees died while in custody would be pursued with a view
towards potential prosecution."
On August 20, 2012, he
114 Exec. Order No.
13491, 3 C.F.R. 13491 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ensuring-lawful-interrogations.
National
security advisors to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney suggested that if he
was elected he should repeal Obama's order and authorize secret enhanced interrogation
techniques. Romney said that he does not consider waterboarding to be torture. Charlie
Savage, Election to Decide Future Interrogation Methods in Terrorism Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/us/politics/election-willdecide-future-of-interrogation-methods-for-terrorism-suspects.html.
115 No Penaltyfor Torture, supra note 105. As the editorial notes, while no one is
facing prosecution for committing torture, former CIA officer John Kiriakou faced trial
for talking with a reporter about torture and identifying who was involved. Kiriakou was
convicted and sentenced to thirty months in confinement. See United States v. Kiriakou,
No. 1:12crl27 (LMB), 2012 WL 3263854, at *I (E.D. Va. 2012).
116 National Security Remarks, supra note 78.
117 Greg Miller, Justice Closes CIA PrisonerProbe Without Charges, WASH. POST
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-closescia-probe-without-charges/2012/08/30/04e8ea22-f2da- 1l e I-892d-
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announced that there was insufficient evidence to file charges in
the two death cases and said they were closed."' A decade after
the Bybee memorandum opined that the Commander-in-Chief
could order the detention and interrogation of anyone, anywhere,
using any means he chooses, and that he could do so with
impunity, the memorandum's prediction proved to be true."l9
4. Indefinite Detention Without Trial or Meaningful
Review
The Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners
of War permits the detention of captured enemy forces and
mandates that they "shall be released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities."' 2 0 That works reasonably
well in a conventional armed conflict where the warring parties at
some point in time decide to enter into an agreement to end
hostilities, but it does not work well in a war declared on a tacticterrorism-that in all likelihood will never reach a termination
point.' 2 ' It could mean a life sentence for those suspected of
involvement in terrorism that are captured and held in detention
without charge or trial.'2 2
A total of 779 men have been detained at Guantanamo Bay
since the detention facility opened on January 11, 2002.123 As of
December 2013, the population stood at 158 detainees.124 That
means that twelve years after the detention facility opened, eighty
percent of the men the Bush administration assured the public

bc92fee603a7_story.html.
118 See id.
119 See, e.g., id. ("The Justice Department said Thursday that it would not file
charges in connection with the deaths of two prisoners held in CIA custody a decade ago,
closing the last active criminal investigation into the agency's treatment of prisoners
after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.").
120 Geneva III, supra note 33, art. 18.
121 See Editorial, America's Detainee Problem, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/23/opinion/la-ed-detention-20120923.
122 See id. (detailing inmates who are in "indefinite detention" since they cannot be
tried or safely released).
123 The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES & NPR, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo/ (an interactive database on Guantanamo detainees).
124 Detainee Transfer Announced, DEP'T OF DEF. NEWS RELEASE (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16436.
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were among the "worst of the worst" have been released from U.S.

custody.125
On September 21, 2012, the Department of Justice released the
names of fifty-five Guantanamo detainees that were approved for
transfer to the custody of other countries as part of a review of all
detainee cases ordered by President Obama in January 2009 and
completed in January 2010.126 The task force identified about
thirty-six detainees that could face criminal prosecution in a
military commission or federal court.127 However, the chief
prosecutor for the military commissions, Brigadier General Mark
Martin, said in June 2013 that, in the end, the number of detainees
likely to face prosecution would not be more than 20, or about 2.5
percent of all the detainees ever held at Guantanamo.'2 8
On March 7, 2011, President Obama signed an executive order
creating an administrative review process to periodically assess
whether each detainee is properly detained for either prosecution
or as an enemy combatant under the law of war.129
The
125 An Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing (Jan. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61624. ("The President
also understands that the people who are detained [at Guantanamo] are detained because,
for the most part they're all al Qaeda, and if they were free they would engage in murder
once again. These are not mere innocents. These are among the worst of the worst who
are being detained because of what they have done, because of the suicidal nature of the
actions that they have taken-their willingness, their training to go out and kill and
destroy and engage in suicide if they can take others with them.")
126 The Associated Press, US. Names 55 Set for Transfer from Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at A6, [hereinafter 55 Set for Transfer], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/americas/united-states-clears-55-detaineesto-leave-guantanamo-bay.html. There are some concerns about the potential transfer of
detainees from Guantanamo. Those assessed as a low risk to the United States and its
allies have already been transferred to other countries. The current list of fifty-five
approved for transfer includes thirty-four assessed as high-risk and the nineteen others
medium-risk. See Thomas Jocelyn, 34 'High Risk' GuantanamoDetainees Approvedfor
Transfer,
LONG
WAR
J.
(Sept.
24,
2012),
http://www.longwarj
ournal.org/archives/2012/09/34_highrisk guantan.php.
127

GUANTANAMO

REVIEW TASK FORCE, Final

Report

(2010), available at

http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport 052810.pdf
128 Jane Sutton, United States Scales Back Plans for Guantanamo Prosecutions,
REUTERS
(June
11,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/1 1/us-usaguantanamo-idUSBRE95AOPA20130611.
129 Exec. Order No. 13567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011), available at
http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-reviewindividuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava.
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Department of Defense announced in July 2013 that it would
begin parole-style hearings for seventy-one detainees, including
forty-six that had been categorized as indefinite detainees because
at the time they were deemed too dangerous to release but not
subject to prosecution and twenty-five detainees previously
considered candidates for prosecution.' 30 The first review board
hearing was conducted on November 20, 2013, with detainee
Mahmud al Mujahid appearing by video teleconference from
Guantanamo before the board convened in Washington, D.C.' 1 It
is uncertain whether the current round of reviews will prove any
more beneficial to detainees than the one completed in 2010 that
found fifty-five detainees eligible for transfer out of Guantanamo,
although few have been released to date. 132
The Supreme Court said in June 2008 that Guantanamo
detainees have the right to challenge the basis for their detention in
federal court. 3 3 Afterwards, the government was unable to
persuade judges at the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia by a preponderance of evidence that there was a
legitimate basis for detention in most cases the judges
considered.134 In the first two years after the Supreme Court's
decision, detainees won fifty-nine percent of their habeas
challenges.' 3 In July 2010, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the first case it
reviewed, Al-Adahi v. Obama, where habeas had been granted.136
130 Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon Prepares Review Panels for 71 Guantanamo
2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/
Detainees, MIAMI HERALD (July 21,
2013/07/21/3512527/pentagon-prepares-parole-board.html.
131 Carol Rosenberg, Guantanamo Prisoner Makes Video-Link Plea for His
Freedom, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/11/22/
3772290/guantanamo-prisoner-pleads.html.
132 See 55 Set for Transfer, supra note 126.
133 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
134 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees Held Illegally,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/us/21
20,
2008),
TIMES
(Nov.
N.Y.
guantanamo.html ("A federal judge issued the Bush administration a sharp setback on
Thursday, ruling that five Algerian men have been held unlawfully at the Guantinamo
Bay detention camp for nearly seven years and ordering their release.").
135 Mark Denbeaux et al., No Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful
Review I (Seton Hall Pub. Law Research Paper, No. 2145554, 2012), available at
papers.ssm.com/5013/papers.cfn?abstract id=2145554##.
136 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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After that decision, the government prevailed in eleven of the next
twelve habeas cases, and the D.C. Circuit reversed the one case
where habeas was granted.'
A Seton Hall study concluded: "The
effect of Al-Adahi on the habeas corpus litigation promised in
Boumediene [v. Bush] is clear. After Al-Adahi, the practice of
careful judicial fact-finding was replaced by judicial deference to
the government's allegations. Now the government wins every
petition."'
In June 2012, the Supreme Court declined review in
seven cases involving detainees.'
The Obama administration attempted to block attorneys from
visiting clients at Guantanamo after their habeas claims were
terminated.140
Chief Judge Royce Lamberth rebuffed the
administration's efforts saying:
The Court has an obligation to assure that those seeking to
challenge their Executive detention by petitioning for habeas
relief have adequate, effective and meaningful access to the
courts. In the case of Guantanamo detainees, access to the
courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is
undisputed that petitioners here have a continuing right to seek
habeas relief. It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to
access the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel.
Therefore, the Government's attempt to supersede the Court's
authority is an illegitimate exercise of Executive power. The
Court, whose duty it is to secure an individual's liberty from
unauthorized and illegal Executive confinement, cannot now tell
a prisoner that he must beg leave of the Executive's grace before
137 Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo/.
138 Denbeaux et al., supra note 135, at 1.
139 Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Detainees' Appeal, Leaving Cloud Over Earlier
Guantanamo Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
06/12/us/politics/justices-decline-to-hear-appeals-by-guantanamo-detainees.html.
The
case of Adnan Latif was the one post-Al-Adahi case where habeas was granted but then
reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and it was one of the seven cases the
Supreme Court declined to consider in June 2012. Latif had been cleared for transfer in
2006 and 2008, and again by the detention review task force in 2010. He was found dead
in his cell at Guantanamo on September 8, 2012. He had been at Guantanamo over ten
and a half years. Charlie Savage, Military Identifies Guantanamo Detainee Who Died,
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/politics/detaineewho-died-at-guantanamo-had-release-blocked-by-court.html.
140 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, 892 F.Supp.
2d 8, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2012).
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the Court will involve itself. This very notion offends the
separation-of-powers principles and our constitutional

scheme.141
While Chief Judge Lamberth's ruling offered a glimmer of
hope that the judicial branch still had some role to play in the
cases of the Guantanamo detainees that will not face trial or
transfer to another country, the prospect of any meaningful judicial
intervention remains unlikely. Lamberth's former colleague,
retired District Court Judge James Robertson, said in July 2012 at
a symposium marking the fourth anniversary of the Supreme
Court's Boumediene decision that the D.C. Circuit has "gutted"
the decision and "taken the capital 'M' off of the word
'meaningful"' in "meaningful review." 4 2 He noted that not a
single detainee has been released as a direct result of a court's
habeas order, but he was cautiously optimistic about the future:
"Some court, some day is going to find that the government can't
hold these people for the rest of their lives."' 43
It does not appear that the day Judge Robertson envisioned has
arrived. On December 3, 2013, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
denial of a writ of habeas corpus in Ali v. Obama.144 The court
said that "the Constitution allows detention of enemy combatants
for the duration of hostilities," although it acknowledged Ali's
argument that he could face "lifetime detention" without charge or
trial.'45 Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the court, said absent
statutory authorization, "it is not the Judiciary's proper role to
devise a novel detention standard that varies with the length of
detention. The only question before us is whether the President
has authority under the AUMF to detain Ali." 46
The reliance on the wartime authority to detain the enemy for
141

Id. at 28.

Lyle Denniston, Ex-judge: Boumediene is Being 'Gutted', SCOTUSBLOG (July
17, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ex-judge-boumediene-is-being-gutted/.
143 Id. The Guantanamo detainees are, in some respects, fortunate to have access to
the courts. Federal courts have so far been unwilling to extend habeas to the much larger
detainee population held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. See Maqaleh v. Hagel,
Nos. 12-5404, 12-5399, 12-5401, 12-5407, 12-5410, 2013 WL 6767861 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
144 Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
145 Id. at 552.
146 Id
142
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the duration of the conflict presents a conundrum for the Obama
administration. In his State of the Union address in February
2013, President Obama said, "by the end of next year, our war in
Afghanistan will be over." 47 With the end of the war likely comes
the end of the authority to detain enemy combatants held because
of their connection to the conflict. It also triggers the obligation
set out in Geneva Convention III to release and repatriate
detainees "without delay." 48 The end of the war in Afghanistan
may hold the best hope for the men who have been detained at
Guantanamo, in some cases for more than a dozen years, with no
end in sight.'4 9
B. ExtrajudicialAssassination andDrone Strikes
Unmanned aerial vehicles-UAVs in military vernacular, or as
they are commonly referred to by the public, drones-have been
in use from the start of the global war on terrorism. "o Their use
has, however, increased dramatically since President Obama took
office in January 2009.'"' Not only has Obama used drone strikes
more frequently than Bush, he has also used them in more places,
in some instances launching strikes far removed from where most
people envision the battlefield.'52 There are scores of issues
related to the use of drones, each one worthy of in-depth analysis,
but particularly relevant to the erosion of the distinction between
civilians and combatants is the unilateral power of the President to
authorize killing almost anyone, almost anywhere, at virtually any
time, and the legal authority for the CIA to kill when it is a civilian
agency that does not enjoy combatant immunity.'53
147 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union
Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.
148 Geneva III, supra note 33, art. 118.
149 See Karen DeYoung, Afghan War's Approaching End Throws Legal Status of
GuantanamoDetainees into Doubt, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2013, at Al.
150 See Unmanned Aircraft (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (July 26, 2013),
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/uas faq/#Qnl.
151 See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone, FOREIGN
POLICY
(Apr.
26,
2010),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articIes/2010/04/26/
thejyear of the-drone.
152 See id.
153 See Jonathan Maters, TargetedKillings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May
23, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.
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Since 9/11, the United States has carried out drone strikes in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya.'5 4 The longest running and
most extensive program by far is the one focused on militants in
the tribal region of Pakistan.'"' The New America Foundation has
documented U.S. drone strikes conducted inside Pakistan from the
first one authorized by President Bush in 2004 to the latest in
2013.116 They report that drone strikes in the country peaked in
2010 when there were 122 strikes-one every three days-that
killed between 609 and 1,027 people.15 7 Their data show that, over
time, the United States has gotten increasingly better at killing
suspected militants and not civilians, but still they estimate that the
number of militants killed accounts for about eighty-one percent
of the 2,847 people confirmed killed in drone strikes.' In 2013,
militants were ninety-five percent of the confirmed killed.15 9 Peter
Bergen, the Director of the National Security Studies Program at
the New America Foundation and CNN's national security
analyst, said that civilians and unknown casualties account for
about eleven percent of those killed during President Obama's
administration and about thirty-three percent during President
Bush's tenure in office.160 As a result of the U.S. drone campaign,
154 See Karen DeYoung, US. Sticks to Secrecy as Drone Strikes Surge, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 2011, at Al; see also Spencer Ackerman, Libya: The Real U.S. Drone
War, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/predatorlibya/.
155 See Karen DeYoung, Secrecy Defines Obama's Drone War, WASH. POST (Dec.
19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secrecy-definesobamas-drone-war/2011/10/28/gIQAPKNR50story.html.
156 See Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, NEW AMERICA FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2013),

[hereinafter
Drone
Wars
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis
Pakistan]. For a variety of reasons, it is impossible to compile definitive data on drone
strikes, but some sources contain data. E.g., UMass Drone, UMass Drone Database,
http://www.umassdrone.org/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) (a research project focused on
exploring the tactical and strategic wisdom of drone strikes); Covert Drone War, The
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category
/projects/drones/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) (an ongoing investigation tracking CIA
drone strikes).
157 See Drone Wars Pakistan,supra note 156.
158 See id.
159 See id.

160 See Drone Strikes Kill, Maim and Traumatize Too Many Civilians, US. Study
Says, CNN (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-usdrone-strikes/index.html.
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Pakistani civilians in the tribal regions are afraid to congregate in
groups for even social gatherings and three-fourths consider the
United States an enemy of Pakistan. 6 '
The Obama administration's drone program differs from the
Bush administration's approach not just in frequency but also in
scope. Under Bush, drone strikes were directed at specific
individuals believed to be high-value leaders in terrorist
organizations. Under Obama, strikes have been directed in some
instances at unidentified individuals engaged in activities with
characteristics suggesting they are terrorism related.162 The former
are known as "personality strikes" and the latter as "signature
strikes." 63 Some joke that the criteria for "signature strikes" are
so lax that "three guys doing jumping jacks" could be construed as
a terrorist training camp, while others worry that men loading a
truck with fertilizer could be deemed bomb makers subject to
attack, when perhaps they were just farmers.164
Conducting signature drone strikes raises questions about
compliance with the international humanitarian law principles of
distinction, proportionality and military necessity.'6 ' The risk such
161

See

STANFORD INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC & NYU

SCHOOL OF LAW GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY AND
TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter
LIVING UNDER DRONES], available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report/.

Yemeni
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi praised U.S. drone strikes in his country and
downplayed concerns about them triggering anti-American sentiment. See Scott Shane,
Yemen's Leader Praises U.S. Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/yemens-leader-president-hadipraises-us-drone-strikes.html?_r-i&. Yemeni citizens do not share the same sentiment.
After a drone strike killed ten civilians, including women and children, a local activist
said "I would not be surprised if 100 tribesmen joined the lines of al-Qaida as a result of
the latest drone mistake. This part of Yemen takes revenge very seriously." See Chris
Woods, Who is Held to Accountfor Deaths by Drones in Yemen?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/06/drone-deaths-yemen.
162 See LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 161.
163

See id; see also CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC

AT COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS,
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, Sept. 2012, at 8,

availableat http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pub/the-civilian-impact-of-drones.
164 See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test Of Obama's
Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all.
165 See Kevin Jon Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine': Signature Strikes and
InternationalLaw, II J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 89, 111 (2013).

1024

N.C. J.INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Vol. XXX

strikes pose to civilians is clear: targeting an unidentified
individual or group based upon a trail of circumstantial evidence
increases the risk to innocent people in the vicinity of the target.16 6
These strikes foment anti-American outrage among the local
population, question the legitimacy of the host-nation government,
and provide the impetus for some who otherwise would not have
taken part in militant activities to do so in reprisal for an attack.167
Additionally, the United States has two drone programs, one
operated by the military and the other by the CIA.6 6 The militaryrun program is governed by the law of war, but the CIA is a
civilian agency that is not under military command and control,
and is not bound by the law of war.169 CIA General Counsel
Stephen Preston told an audience at Harvard Law School in April
2012 that they act "in a manner consistent with the four basic
principles in the law of armed conflict governing the use of force,"
but a commitment to act consistent with those laws is not the same
as being bound by them.' 70 Some have called for turning over
responsibility for all lethal drone operations to the military
alone.' 7 ' James Ross, Legal and Policy Director for Human Rights
Watch, opined: "When the CIA general counsel says that the
agency need only act in 'a manner consistent' with the 'principles'
of international law, he is saying the laws of war aren't really law
at all. The Obama administration should make it clear that there's
no 'CIA exception' for its international legal obligations."' 72
See id. at 114.
See Danya Greenfield, The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only
'Act' Like Terrorists, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-actlike-terrorists/278744/.
168 See Micha Zenko, TransferringCIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-dronestrikes-pentagon/p30434.
169 See Q&A: US Targeted Killings andInternationalLaw, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/19/q-us-targeted-killings-andinternational-law.
170 The Honorable Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, CIA, CIA and the Rule of
Law (Apr. 10, 2012).
171 See US: Transfer CIA Drone Strikes to Military, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr.
20, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/20/us-transfer-cia-drone-strikes-military.
172 Id. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed Freedom of Information
Act requests with several federal agencies seeking information on the legal basis for
166
167
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A civilian agency controlled and operated paramilitary drone
program has been the subject of significant criticism. United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, noted in his 2010 study on
targeted killing that lethal drone strikes carried out by CIA
personnel could subject the civilian operators to prosecution for
murder under U.S. domestic law or the law of the country where
the strike took place, or war crime charges if the target was not
directly participating in hostilities at the time of the strike.'
The legal confusion that results from having civilians involved
in lethal combat operations was apparent in the military
commission of Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Khadr
was charged with murder in violation of the law of war for
throwing a grenade that killed a U.S. service member during a
firefight in Afghanistan.' 74 Khadr was not in uniform, and he was
not serving as part of an armed force or militia. Accordingly, he
did not qualify for combatant immunity, which shields those
acting in compliance with the law of war from criminal
responsibility for the deliberate killing of another person.'
The
U.S. Government had to amend its definition of murder in
violation of the law of war shortly before Khadr's trial began
when it realized that defining the offense to include someone who
was not in uniform and who therefore did not meet the
requirements of international humanitarian law to qualify as a
lawful combatant could apply to CIA drone operators.176

drone strikes. The CIA refused to confirm or deny that it had any documents related to
drone strikes. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, found that "[t]he CIA
has proffered no reason to believe that disclosing whether it has any documents at all
about drone strikes will reveal whether the Agency itself-as opposed to some other
U.S. entity such as the Defense Department - operates drones." The court remanded the
case for further proceedings. See ACLU v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 710 F.3d 422,
428 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
173 See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, T 70, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).
174 See Omar Ahmed Khadr, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/25/omar-ahmed-khadr.
175 See Morris Davis, The Law of War Does Not Shield the CIA and John
Brennan's Drone Kill List, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/feb/08/law-war-cia-john-brennan-drone-kill-list.
176 See Charlie Savage, U.N. Official to Ask U.S. to End C.I.A. Drone Strikes, N.Y.
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On May 23, 2013, the White House published a Presidential
Policy Guidance factsheet on the conduct of lethal strikes outside
the United States.' 77 In it, President Obama pledged that the
United States would respect national sovereignty and international
law. He could take a major step in that direction by officially
assigning responsibility for lethal drone operations to the
Department of Defense and mandating that uniformed members of
the armed forces acting in accordance with international
humanitarian law conduct all such operations.17 8
IV. The Road Forward: A Guiding Light or a Warning Light?
On September 14, 2012, President Obama went to Andrews
Air Force Base for the arrival of the bodies of Ambassador
Christopher Stevens and State Department employees Sean Smith,
Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods who were killed in Benghazi,
Libya, in an attack on the U.S. Consulate on September 11th.' 79
Speaking at the ceremony, the President praised the men as heroes,
saying they embraced and lived the American ideal. He ended his
remarks:
Most of all, even in our grief, we will be resolute. For we are
Americans, and we hold our head high knowing that because of
these patriots-because of you-this country that we love will
always shine as a light unto the world. 8 0
President Obama's reference to the United States shining as a
light unto the world drew upon the words former President Ronald
Reagan used often about America representing "a shining city on a
TIMES, May 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/world/asia/28drones.html.
177 Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Proceduresfor the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-forcecounterterrorism.
178 See Daniel Klaidman, Exclusive: No More Drones for CIA, THE DAILY BEAST,
Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/19/exclusive-no-moredrones-for-cia.html.
179 See David Nakamura, PresidentHonors 'FourPatriots' Who Died in Benghazi,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 15, 2012, at A9.
180 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Transfer of Remains
14,
2012),
available at
for
Benghazi
Victims
(Sept.
Ceremony
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/remarks-president-transferremains-ceremony-benghazi-victims.
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hill."'"' The question is: does America shine as a guiding light or
as a warning light?
Since 9/11, the United States has disparaged and disregarded
international agreements it helped to create, crafted novel legal
arguments in an effort to avoid application of laws it found
inconvenient, redefined terms to fit its own purposes, and hid
behind a curtain of secrecy whenever anyone challenged it.'12
Large numbers of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans,
embrace the notion of virtually limitless presidential power: the
Commander-in-Chief can ignore any law, foreign or domestic, that
impedes what he or she alone decides is necessary in the interest
of national security; he or she can detain and torture anyone
suspected of being a threat; and if capture may prove difficult, he
or she can order a civilian agency to hunt the suspect down and
kill him. Are those the kinds of values America should hold up as
examples to the world?
In a speech on national security policy at the National Defense
University in May 2013, President Obama said:
From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the
decisions that we are making now will define the type of nationand world-that we leave to our children.
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and
scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be
mindful of James Madison's warning that "[njo nation could
preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Neither
I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We
will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human
beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But
what we can do-what we must do-is dismantle networks that
pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups
to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and
ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we have to
make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned wisdom.' 83
181 See Lou Cannon, PresidentExtols State ofNation; Administration 'Restored the
American Dream,' Reagan Says, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1988, at Al. The phrase comes
from the Bible in the Book of Matthew, Chapter 5, Verse 14: "You are the light of the
world. A city set on a hill cannot be hidden." Matthew 5:14.
182 See Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1629,1630(2012).
183 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
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If the period since 9/11 reflects how the United States views it
obligations under international humanitarian law, then it should
have the integrity to renounce the agreements it does not intend to
honor. If, on the other hand, President Obama means what he says
about America's values being the nation's strongest national
security asset, he needs to lead the way and practice what he
preaches. Erasing clear distinctions and replacing them with
blurred lines undermines the foundation of the law of war. The
road the United States chooses will determine if the foundation it
spent decades helping to build is made of sandstone or granite.

University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.

